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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re. the Matter of the Estate of: 
RAYMA LYNNETTE PERCELL, 
deceased 
Diana Lynn Lohman, 
Petitioner and Appellee 
v . • • " ' • • • 
Galen Headley, 
Respondent and Appellant 
: >'' "\ '. J , , . v 
Case No. 20110651-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. ARGUMENT 
In his Opening Brief, the Appellant, Galen Headley ("Headley") set forth four 
arguments: 1) legally relevant evidence of equitable title may rebut the presumption of 
ownership created by a bill of sale; 2) as a matter of law, the Trial Court erred in not 
considering such legally relevant evidence which rebuts the presumption of ownership in 
the Appellee, Diana Lohman as Personal Representative for the Estate of Rayma Percell 
(hereinafter referred to as "Lohman"); 3) as a matter of fact, Headley has established 
equitable ownership; and 4) remand is unnecessary. 
In response, in her Brief of Appellee ("Brief), Lohman tries to convince this 
Court that the only applicable standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard - and 
that the issue on appeal is merely factual. She does this by framing her Issue No. 1 as a 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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question of fact: "Did the Trial Court Sufficiently Weigh the h'videnee Againsl I featlley's 
Presumption of Ownership of the Tractor;" arguing for the clearly erroneous standard; 
and then claiming that Headley did not adequately marshal evidence. 
In fact, Lohman spends the majority of her argument on the following questions of 
law embedded into her Brief, each related to the equitable ownership balancing test: 
1) what stand.irill DI prool i> required/ *) shall the ('ourl ronsider Ihr Parties1 relationship 
as one factor?; 3) is an express agreement necessary to convey ownership?; 4) shall the 
Court consider intent when analyzing actions of acquiescence?; and 5) is Headley's belief 
of ownership relev ai it? 
As more fully argued herein, the correct legal analysis to determine ownership of 
untitled farm eqi lipment is the equitable ownership balancing test, which heavily weighs 
in Headley's favor. By its very nature, this balancing test requires onl> a prep< :>t .den trice 
of the evidence to establish ownership. In addition, as with any balancing test, this Court 
shall consider all relevant factors, including the Parties' relationship; evidence of an 
express agreement to convey or acquiescence of the same .nidi I lead lev *s belief i if 
ownership. And, when determining if acquiescence has occurred, a party's subjective 
intent is not relevant 
Lohman's marshaling argument also fails. As more fully argued herein, Headley 
has met his heavy burden in marshaling all facts which support the Trial Court's ruling. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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A. THE CORRECT LEGAL ANALYSIS IS THE EQUITABLE 
OWNERSHIP BALANCING TEST 
In her Brief, Lohman attempts to indirectly undermine the applicability of the 
equitable ownership balancing test by attacking Jackson v. James, 89 P.2d 235 (Utah 
1941). Lohman's reliance on Stewart v. Commerce Ins. Co. of Glen Falls, New York, 114 
Utah 278 (Utah 1948) is unhelpful to her case, though. In fact, Stewart supports 
Headley's position and does not disturb the Court's holding in Jackson. 
In line with the equitable ownership balancing test, the Stewart Court expressly 
analyzed at least eight factors to determine ownership: possession, title, registration, 
insurance, maintenance, agreement to purchase, payment of purchase price, and 
relationship between the parties. In that case, a potential buyer of a decedent's car took 
possession of the car to drive it to a meeting with the decedent's estate, during which 
drive he totaled the vehicle. Id. at 280-282. The title, registration, and insurance were 
still in the decedent's name; the estate had not agreed on a purchase price for the car; and 
the potential buyer had not spent money on repairs or maintenance. Id. at 281-282. In 
addition, there was no relationship between the potential buyer and the decedent. Id. at 
285. The Court found, on these facts, that the decedent's estate still owned the car at the 
time of the collision. Id. at 279. 
In this case, the Trial Court failed to apply the equitable ownership balancing test 
and erred in not allowing legally relevant facts to rebut the presumption of ownership. 
To this end, this Court must overturn the Trial Court's ruling under the correction of legal 
standard of review. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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B. THE CORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF IS PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE 
In her Brief, Lohman argues that the applicable burden of proof in this case is the 
clear and convincing evidence standard. In support, Lohman cites to Hanks v. Hales, 411 
P.2d 836 (Utah 1966) but offers no discussion of this issue. Lohman's reliance on Hanks 
is misplaced for several reasons: 1) the facts of Hanks are dissimilar to the case before 
this Court; 2) the Hanks' "finding," as cited by Lohman, is dictum and contained in a 
footnote of the Court's opinion, Id. at 838, fn 2; and 3) said finding applies only to cases 
involving real property. Id. 
In fact, it is well established in Utah that the presumed standard of evidence in 
civil cases, where money damages are at stake, is a preponderance of the evidence. See 
Egbert v. Nissan North America Inc., 167 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Utah 2007). The 
intermediate standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence is appropriate in a civil 
case when the interest at stake is particularly important and more substantial than the 
mere loss of money. Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, 2011 Utah 71, f 21 (Utah 
2011). For example, the United States and Utah Supreme Courts have applied the clear 
and convincing evidence standard in cases involving civil commitment, deportation, 
deneutralization, and parental liberty interests. Egbert at 1061-1062 (quoting Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,432-433 (U.S. \979);Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,285 (U.S. 
1966); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (U.S. 1960); Uzelac v. Thurgood 144 
P.3d 1083 (Utah 2006)). 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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Utah Courts have also applied the clear and convincing evidence standard to 
disputes involving real property. See e.g., Wasatch Cnty. v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768 
(Utah 2008) (dedication of highways to public use by abandonment); Swenson v. 
Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000) (abandonment of restrictive covenants); W. Gateway 
Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977) (abandonment of easements); 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966) (an attack on the 
validity of a deed); Ashton v. Ashton, 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah App. 1995) (a challenge to 
the validity of a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship); Marchant v. Park City, 111 
P.2d 677, 682 (Utah App. 1989) (establishment of prescriptive easements). 
By contrast, personal property cases do not include the kind of interest for which a 
higher standard of proof is appropriate. See Egbert at 1062 (preponderance of the 
evidence sufficient to overcome presumption of non-defectiveness of a manufacturer's 
product). Here, a preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof to 
overcome the presumption of ownership a bill of sale creates in dated farm equipment. 
C. THE PARTIES' RELATIONSHIP IS A RELEVANT FACTOR FOR 
ANALYSIS UNDER THE EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP BALANCING 
TEST 
Lohman also argues that Jackson is not relevant because of the married status of 
the parties therein. In doing so, Lohman argues that the Court shall analyze one 
additional factor as part of its equitable ownership balancing test: the relationship of the 
Parties. Headley concedes that the parties' relationship is relevant because it bears on the 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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reasonableness of requiring a written transfer of property. See Jackson, 97 Utah at 43, 
52. 
Lohman urges this Court to consider the relationship of the Parties, and then 
argues that the correct relationship test is that of employer/employee: "[Headley's] use 
of the Tractor at Cadillac Ranch is no different than an employee using equipment that 
belongs to a company" (Appellee Br. 14). In doing so, Lohman ignores hours of 
testimony regarding the intimacy of the relationship between Headley and Percell, the co-
mingling of assets, Headley's involvement in designing and planning Cadillac Ranch RV 
Park, and Headley's use of the Tractor on other property owned by him and in the normal 
course of his construction business (Tr. 20, 24-26, 37-40, 52-54, 65-70, 72, 93-96, 106, 
111:1). Specifically, just like in Jackson, the Parties to this case lived as husband and 
wife: they cohabitated for eighteen years prior to the death of Rayma Percell ("Percell") 
at seventy years old; they owned joint property together; they co-mingled their financial 
assets including several joint checking accounts and joint loans; they designed, 
constructed, and ran a business together; and for a period of years, Headley financially 
supported Percell (Tr. 20, 37-40, 52-54, 65-69, 72, 93-96,106, 111:1). 
This Court must consider the relationship of the parties when analyzing equitable 
ownership. And, here, given the intimate relationship, the age, and the history of the 
parties, it is unreasonable to require Percell to transfer title to farm equipment via a 
written document. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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D. AN EXPRESSAGREEMENT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH 
OWNERSHIP UNDER THE EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP 
BALANCING TEST 
Throughout her Brief, Lohman repeatedly points out that Percell never expressly 
agreed to convey the Tractor to Headley, by a bill of sale or other express discussion 
(Appellee Br. 7-8, 10, 13, 18, 19). She also argues that the clear and convincing evidence 
standard for written conveyances of real property should control (Appellee Br. 8-10). In 
doing so, Lohman fails to appreciate the substantial difference between interests in real 
property and untitled personal property. And she ignores long-established Utah law that 
a written agreement is not required per se to transfer ownership of personal property. 
An agreement to sell or buy personal property may be established by 
acquiescence. See e.g., Johnston v. Simpson, 621 P.2d 688 (Utah 1980) (buyer 
acquiesced to purchase through acceptance of delivery of aircraft, payment of purchase 
price, use of the aircraft for two years, and loan of aircraft to friends); Dahl v. Prince, 119 
Utah 556 (Utah 1951); Jackson, 97 Utah at 43, 52; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. 
Group, 868 P.2d 110 (Utah App. 1994) (seller acquiescence where seller delivered the 
car to buyer and accepted payment); Lake Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 
P.2d 951, 956 (Utah App. 1993) (no acquiescence where seller repeatedly and expressly 
reasserted ownership several times). 
The fact that Percell did not convey the Tractor to Headley by a Bill of Sale or 
other express agreement does not defeat Headley's claim of equitable ownership. The 
preponderance of the evidence shows that Percell acquiesced ownership to Headley. 
'•''•"• Appellant's Reply Brief 
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Percell never acted as owner of the Tractor after 1997, and she repeatedly failed to object 
to Headley's actions as owner. Percell accepted payment of at least ten percent of the 
purchase price of the Tractor (Tr. 70-71, 99, Exh. 3:1); she did not object to Headley's 
exclusive use, maintenance, and insurance of the Tractor (Tr. 20-21, 26-27,40-41, 72-87, 
Exhs. 3-7:1); she did not protest Headley's purchase of all of the implements and tires for 
the Tractor after the initial purchase in 1995 (Tr. 72-73, 75-78, 86-87, 97, 104, 115, Exhs. 
4, 6:1); she allowed Headley to pay taxes on the Tractor eleven of fourteen years (Tr. 40-
41, 72-73, Exh. 4:1); she did not object to Headley's exclusive control and possession of 
the Tractor (Tr. 39, 41, 69-70, 72-87, 97, 104-106,115, Exh. 3-7:1); and she did not 
object to Headley's characterization of the Tractor as "theirs" or "his" (Tr. 104-105:1). 
E. A PARTY'S SUBJECTIVE INTENT IS NOT RELEVANT TO A 
DETERMINATION OF ACQUIESCENCE 
In her brief, Lohman repeatedly argues that Headley has failed to prove that 
Percell intended to sell Headley the Tractor, or that Headley intended to buy the Tractor 
(Appellee Br. 13, 14, 18, 19). According to Lohman, without such subjective intent, 
acquiescence cannot occur. 
In fact, in 2007, the Utah Supreme Court held that subjective intent is not an 
element of acquiescence. Botanical Farms, at f 25, 27. In its analysis, the Court defined 
acquiescence as "tacit or passive acceptance." Id. at 26, fh 38 {quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 26 (9th ed. 2009)). "[Acquiescence] implies a relationship in which one 
person takes affirmative actions, and the acquiescing party consents to such action by 
failing to object." Id. Acquiescence may be tacit, inferred from evidence, shown by 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Page 12 of 19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
silence, or established through the failure to object. Botanical Farms, at \ 27; RHN Corp. 
v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, 942 (Utah 2004); Bahr v. Imus, 250 P.3d 56 (Utah 2011). Thus, 
the determination of acquiescence is based on the objective behavior of the parties 
regardless of their subjective intent to act in such a manner. Id. at f 26, 27; see also 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417,420 (Utah 1990); Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 
947 (Utah 1966). 
Again, Percell did not behave in a fashion consistent with ownership. She also 
never took action inconsistent with Headley's ownership. The facts show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Percell acquiesced to Headley's ownership of the 
Tractor by at least 1997. 
F. BELIEF OF OWNERSHIP IS A RELEVANT FACTOR FOR 
ANALYSIS UNDER THE EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP BALANCING 
TEST 
Near the end of her Brief, Lohman argues that belief of ownership is not a separate 
factor for analysis by this Court. Lohman cites to Betenson v. Call Auto and Equip. 
Sales, 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982), and specifically one statement by the Court therein that 
"[the plaintiffs'] beliefs are not determinative of their status." Id. at 686. However, 
Lohman offers this statement out of context, thereby exaggerating its importance. In that 
case, the Utah Supreme Court did consider belief of ownership as one factor (along with 
express language in a written agreement), but found that other relevant facts disproved 
ownership in a joint venture. Id. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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Belief of ownership is not determinative • . i 
other relevant factors under the equitable ownership balancing test. See, e.g., United 
States v. > Currency, 189 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1999); Betenson, 645 P.2d at 686; 
l\mii,i inun In* » t'hin limit 1 /1" N W M ' ' 1 ( Ml mn I (>X S) (acceptance of boat where 
buyer paid purchase price, considered himself owner, and authorized ivp;nrs I //< 
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins, Co., 131 M.W.2cl 265, 
" '<)<>• ' ( > ; I Iowa !''M I (Dciici oi ownership rebuts presumption of ownership arising from 
title certificate); Auto-Owner s h is G » i Stubban, 867 N E 2, 1 1046, 1049 (11 
2007) (driver of ATV believed he was the owner, and had all incidents of ownership 
other than title); i M r ,„* x ? *- * " . Empire pirc & Marine Ins Co „ 2 S W,3il 
"
:
 • considered 
himself the owner, and had sole possession and control of it). 
INcxI, I ohman Lirp,ucs Ihal South ('.miliiu irirniiln I il1,, lindiiii' in foliisonv. 
Reaves, 289 S.E.2d 163 (S.C. 1982), which found that belief of ownership is one factoi in 
the equitable ownership balancing test. Lohman's reliance on Unisun Ins, co. t>. First 
Siwtlwm his. ( )» , 4(hl S I; M *b\) |S I I 'WS) is erroneous for three reasons; I) citing 
Tollison, the South Carolina Supreme Court first re-affirmed established law 1:1 u it the 
presumption of ownership created by a certificate of title can be rebutted by evidence 
shewing that someone other than the titleholder is the real owner, Id. at 262; 2) the 
Court analyzed the legal definition of ownership under So illli ('<irolm,i Uw not belief of 
ownership by these two insurance companies, Id.; and 3) as pointed out by Lohman in heir 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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Brief, the Court re-states that ownership is a question of fact to be considered on a case-
by-case basis. Id. In Unisun, the Court considered many factors under the equitable 
ownership balancing test including title, registration, possession, control, maintenance, 
and insurance. Id. 
Lohman's remaining cases do not address belief of ownership and either support 
Headley's position or are irrelevant. See Harris v. Harris, 218 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(brand on cattle created presumption of ownership, which was rebutted by other factors, 
including a share agreement and older brands, creating ownership in third parties); In re. 
In re. Ozey, 111 B.R. 83,96-97 (Bkrtcy. N.D.Okl. 1994) (court determined vessel owned 
by corporation after consideration of many factors); Stone v. Flint, 238 P.3d 70 (Utah 
App. 2010) (contract interpretation case analyzing the use of the word "all" in a contract). 
G. HEADLEY ADEQUATELY MARSHALED EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT HIS CLAIM OF EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP 
In his Opening Brief, Headley argues that once this Court establishes that the Trial 
Court erred in not considering legally relevant evidence rebutting the presumption of 
ownership, it can determine ownership of the Tractor based on the undisputed facts in the 
record without remand. 
In response, Lohman primarily argues that Headley failed to properly marshal the 
evidence for his claim of ownership. Lohman sites to this Court's holding in State ex 
rel P.N., 262 P.3d 429 (Utah App. 2011) and argues that Headley did not marshal certain 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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.facts favorable to 1 olmun In '", ' * llliis ( 'ourl found (li.ill llim; l leadln "luis line UVAS \ 
burden of marshaling the evidence In support of the verdict." Id. at 430. 
S|Hviliuilly I .iiliiiiii.iii .iiT'tics Ihiil llns < 'ourl should i d use lo consider Idiis appeal 
because Headley failed to marshal three facts: "that the Tractor was bought and belonged 
to Cadillac Ranch, that Percell never told him nor Lohman who was to have the Tractor 
upon I KM' dealh, |-ind| thai I he money Headlej paid U> Peuell that he alleges were to pay 
for the loan on the Tractor cannot be shown to have been it isecl to pa> for the I i , ; .ctor" 
(Appellee Br. at 15) •'
 { , , * 
In fact, in Sections IV and VI(C) of his Opening Brief, Head! arshaled all 
relevant facts that supported the verdict. First, Lohman is dead wrong in stating that 
Headley ignored facts supporting Percell's (aka Cadillac Ranch's) legal ownership. 
Headley's entire argument and Opening Brief rei 'ol vesai JI ind the t • tl lat IE !l> = ircell < • i,/ , ; is 
the legal owner and Headley was the equitable owner. Headley marshaled the following 
facts that support PercelPs legal ownership: 
1. Percell signed the Bill of Sale (Tr. 69, Exh. 1:1; Op. Br. i 1, 24); 
2. Percell paid the initial purchase price for 1 he 1 it: ; tc ti : i R ith a per son* till cl l e d :* i, i: i ::l 
cashier's check (Tr. 25, 39:1; Op. Br. 11, 24); 
3 p e r c e u paid three years of taxes on th* — t • • 
(
 . • : a n d . . . ; . - - * ' .- -..- • - • . . .. • > • •• ; . - : . ,.f 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
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4. Headley used the Tractor to improve the Cadillac Ranch RV Park as well as on 
other property owned by him and in the normal course of his construction 
business (Tr. 24-26, 39-40, 68-70:1; Op. Br. 11,24). 
Second, Lohman points to hearsay testimony in arguing that Lohman's statements 
regarding Percell's supposed death-bed wishes are relevant and must be marshaled. The 
Trial Court properly did not consider such hearsay testimony: "[The Court] can only 
consider [Percell's] desire to the extent that they are expressed in her will. Otherwise, 
they are irrelevant." (Tr. 125:1). This hearsay testimony was not relevant in the lower 
court, and it is not relevant now. In contrast, the fact that Percell never signed a Bill of 
Sale conveying the Tractor to Headley is certainly relevant, as marshaled by Headley (Tr. 
96-104:1; Op. Br. 12). 
Third, Lohman tries to masquerade a challenge to the reliability of Headley9 s 
testimony as a failure to marshal argument. Headley entered into evidence checks for 
four months of payments on the Tractor in 1996 (Tr. Exh. 3:1). These checks total 
$1,383.32, which equals approximately ten percent of the purchase price of the Tractor 
(Tr. 70-72, 92-93, 99, Exh. 3:1). The memos on these checks show payment to Cadillac 
Ranch RV Park and Percell for "Massey Ferguson tractor payments" (Tr. Exh. 3:1). 
Headley then testified that he reimbursed Percell for loan payments on the Tractor via 
these checks (Tr. 70-72, 92-93:1). Lohman did not present any evidence, via written 
documentation or testimony, to dispute this evidence of payment. Headley marshaled 
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this evidence in his Opening Brief on several pages (Tr, 70-72, 92-93, 99, Exh. r 1 ; O p . 
I'liir, Il ill, U , 2 . S ) . ' ': < ' ' ' '' :: ' ; 
This Court is not the trier of fact, so Lohman's evidentiary argument does not 
ini(Kt't il I  Iciiillrv \i iii.iisliiiliiiii.111 bunion I  In I lull ( 'ourl iiccepted unsubstantiated evidence 
from both Parties as true based on live testimony. The Trial Court found that Perce 11 puid 
for the initial Purchase Price, even though Lohman never produced any written 
documentation proving said payment, and it also held that Headley spent "substantial 
sums of money'" i »n Ilir I  rutlmr | I ir I Ml-1 !s>: I I', J.' ! 11 hv issue in nv is w hilllin i these 
facts, as marshaled, support Headley's equitable ownership. 
II . CONCLUSION 
Appellant Galen Headley respectfully requests this Court review the Trial Court's 
application of the rebuttable presump1 - • wi i /xsf 11 \ 
balancing test to this case. And, upon meaningful appellate review of the undisputed 
facts, based on the preponderance of the evidence, Headley requests this Court overturn 
flic i niiil t 'iniiiil". iiiliiij1 iind LMIUT in order for 1 kticJIey s equitable title to the Enactor, 
DATED this 17th day of February 21)] 2. 
Christina R. Sloan, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant Galen Headley 
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